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Ruling
HEARDEN, et al. vs. WINDSOR REDDING CARE CENTER, LLC, et al.
Aug 08, 2024 |CVPO21-0198083
LLC, ET AL.Case Number: CVPO21-0198083Tentative Ruling on Motions to Compel Depositions: Plaintiffs seek an order compelling thedepositions of various Defendants PMQ related to insurance. Plaintiff also seek sanctions totaling$3,960. Separate motions have been filed against the following Defendants: Windsor Redding Care Center, LLC Brius Management Co. Brius LLC S&F Management Company Boardwalk West Financial Services, LLC Eretz River Valley Properties, LLC Jeffrey Staffing, LLC River Valey Healthcare & Wellness Center Rockport Administrative Services, LLC Rockport Healthcare Support Services, LLC Windsor Norcal 13 Holdings, LLCMerits of Motion: A “party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that isrelevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motionmade in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonablycalculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim ordefense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. Discovery may beobtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, aswell as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any document,electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property.” CCP § 2017.020. Acivil litigant’s right to discovery is broad. Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.“[I]n accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as torelevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.Here, Plaintiffs have propounded eleven separate deposition subpoenas to individual Defendantsseeking to depose their PMQ related to issues of insurance. Defendants oppose the depositions onthe grounds that Plaintiffs are only entitled to insurance information expressly permitted by CCP§ 2017.210 which states: “A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any agreement under which any insurance carrier may be liable to satisfy in whole or in part a judgment that may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. This discovery may include the identity of the carrier and the nature and limits of the coverage. A party may also obtain discovery as to whether that insurance carrier is disputing the agreement’s coverage of the claim involved in the action, but not as to the nature and substance of that dispute. Information concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in evidence at trial.”Undoubtedly, Section 2017.210 permits Plaintiffs to obtain some of the information that is subjectto the depositions notices; specifically, the existence and applicable terms of insurance policiesand indemnity agreements which may apply to the current action. Plaintiffs’ position is that thescope of the subpoenas is also relevant to the issues of alter ego and joint venture liability. Thealter ego test encompasses a number of factors including the use of the corporate entity to procureservices for another entity. Greenspan v. LADT (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 512-13. Further, acourt must examine all circ*mstances to determine if the alter ego theory applies. Id. at 513. Areview of the specific topics of the deposition and request for production of documents shows thatPlaintiffs position establishes good cause. The information sought could in any number of waysprovide admissible evidence or to the discovery of information which is reasonably calculated tolead to admissible evidence related to alter ego or joint venture liability. For example, it couldprovide information that one Defendant was procuring insurance services for another. Based onthe foregoing, the Court finds good cause to compel the depositions. In reaching this conclusion,the Court notes that discovery should be liberally permitted, and any doubts must be resolved infavor of permitting the discovery. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co, supra 2 Cal.3d at 173. The Court is notmaking a finding at this time that any of the testimony or documents obtained would be admissibleat trial. A determination of that nature will be made by the trial court at the time of trial or pursuantto a motion in limine.Sanctions: The imposition of sanctions is mandatory against the party that unsuccessful makes oropposes a motion unless they acted with substantial justification. CCP § 2025.450(g)(1).Defendants’ objections to the very broad scope of the discovery were not unwarranted. The Courtfinds that Defendants acted in good faith and that their actions were substantially justified. Therequest for sanctions is denied.The motions are GRANTED. The request for sanctions is DENIED. No proposed orders werelodged with the Court as required by Local Rule 5.17(D). Plaintiffs shall prepare the order(s).lodged with the Court as required by Local Rule 5.17(D). Plaintiffs shall prepare the order(s).J.D. VS. THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ASSEMBLIES OF
Ruling
TATYANA IVANOVA VS XAVIER IBARRA, ET AL.
Aug 05, 2024 |21STCV28754
Case Number: 21STCV28754 Hearing Date: August 5, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 32 HEARING DATE August 5, 2024 CASE NUMBER 21STCV28754 MOTION Motion to Strike Answer MOVING PARTY Plaintiff Tatyana Ivanova OPPOSING PARTY None MOTION On August 4, 2021, Plaintiff Tatyana Ivanova (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Xavier Ibarra, Chen Family Trust, Co-Trustees Jack M Chen and Shirley Chen, La Verne-Live Oak Homeowners Association, Inc., and Does 1 to 10 for strict liability, negligence, and premises liability surrounding a dog bite. On February 22, 2022, Defendant Chen Family Trust (Defendant) filed an answer, in pro per. Plaintiff now moves to strike Defendants answer, arguing that it cannot be filed without representation from a licensed attorney. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD California law authorizes a partys motion to strike matter from an opposing partys pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn in conformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) A motion to strike is used to address defects that appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matter but that are not grounds for a demurrer. (Pierson v Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342; see also City & County of San Francisco v Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913 (motion may not be based on a party's declaration or factual representations made by counsel in the motion papers).) In particular, a motion to strike can be used to attack the entire pleading or any part thereof in other words, a motion may target single words or phrases, unlike demurrers. (Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 40.) The Code of Civil Procedure also authorizes the Court to act on its own initiative to strike matters, empowering the Court to enter orders striking matter at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) MEET AND CONFER Before filing a motion to strike . . . the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) If no agreement is reached, the moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either: (1) the means by which the parties met and conferred and that the parties did not reach an agreement, or (2) that the party who filed the pleading failed to respond to the meet and confer request or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).) There is no declaration attached to this motion. Though it does not appear the parties met or conferred in-person or by telephone, [a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a)(4).) ANALYSIS Generally, a trustee or executor who is not a lawyer cannot appear in pro per in legal proceedings to protect assets of the estate or trust because in this capacity such trustee would be representing interests of others and would therefore be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. (Ziegler v. Nickel¿(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 545, 548.) However, a trustee who is not a lawyer may represent the trust in pro per if they are the sole trustee, the trusts sole creator, and the beneficiary. (Aulisio v. Bancroft¿(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1524 [[A] trustee litigating on behalf of a trust in which he as the settlor has designated himself the sole beneficiary is not representing the interests of others. The interest he represents is his own.].) Here, page two of Defendants answer is signed by Jack M. Chen, Executor for Defendant Chen Family Trust. On the first page of the answer, there is no attorney name or bar license number. Additionally, the caption shows that Defendant is listed as: Chen Family Trust, Co-trustees Jack M. Chen & Shirley S. Chen. Therefore, the face of the answer does not show that Defendant is being represented by a licensed attorney, or that the trust has a single trustee. Defendant has not opposed this motion despite receiving notice by mail and fails to set forth judicially noticeable facts showing that self-representation is proper.[1] Therefore, because the answer was not filed by a licensed attorney, it was an unauthorized practice of law. As a result, the motion to strike is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend. Defendant Chen Family Trust must file an answer with licensed counsel within 30 days. Plaintiff shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file a proof of service of such. [1] The Court also denied Chen Family Trusts motion to dismiss on November 9, 2023, noting the same defect. No appearance of counsel appears on the courts docket.
Ruling
AURA L GONZALEZ MARTINEZ VS. CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO ET AL
Aug 09, 2024 |CGC22600599
On the Law and Motion Calendar for Friday, August 9, 2024, line 4. DEFENDANTS HERNAN GAELA, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Continued to August 23, 2024, to allow the opposition a chance to comply with SF Local Rule 2.7B (courtesy copies). Friday's Law & Motion Calendar will be called out of Dept. 301. Anyone intending to appear in person should report to Dept. 301. However, anyone intending to appear remotely should use the regular Zoom information for Dept. 302's Law & Motion Calendar for 9:30 a.m. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/RCE)
Ruling
SALTSMAN, Sr., et al. vs. HEADRICK LOGGING INC., et al.
Aug 06, 2024 |CVPO21-0198364
SALTSMAN, SR., ET AL. VS. HEADRICK LOGGING INC., ET AL.Case Number: CVPO21-0198364Tentative Ruling on Motion for Mental Examination and for Protective Order: Defendant HeadrickLogging, Inc. (hereinafter “Defendant”) moves for an order requiring Plaintiff to submit to a medical examinationpursuant to CCP § 2032. Defendant also seeks a protective order as to the scope of tests, to permit a broad lineof questioning, and to limit the production of the audio record and raw data.Scope of Tests: The Joint Statement filed by the parties provides they have reached a resolution on this issue.The tests listed in the Notice of Motion will be authorized by the Court.Interview Topics: Defendant has requested fifteen specific interview topics to be conducted by their expert. Afterfurther meet and confer, the parties have agreed to remove the topic of “Among other information.” The partieshave also agreed to the inclusion of the following topics: “use of alcohol, drugs and other intoxicants,” “educationattainment and academic history,” “occupation history,” “psychiatric history,” and “complaint/symptoms.” Theremaining topics remain at issue.The Court has reviewed the proposed topics and finds that all remaining topics except “legal history” areappropriate for the interview. The Court will authorize those topics with that exception.Raw Data and Recording: The primary dispute between the parties is the scope of the production of the defenseexpert’s raw data and recording of the IME. Defendant requests an order authorizing the dissemination of theraw data and the recording to Plaintiff’s expert only, and objects to the information being provided to Plaintiff’scounsel. The limitation on disclosure requested by Defendant is based on the defense expert’s concerns relatedto her ethical obligations, the risk of compromising future tests, the misuse and misinterpretation of the tests, thesocietal impact if the tests are disseminated, and the harm of such a disclosure. Plaintiff’s position is that hiscounsel is entitled to the recording and raw data pursuant CCP § 2032.610 as interpreted by Randy’s Trucking,Inc. v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 818.In Randy’s Trucking, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s order requiring an expert to turnover the raw data and the recording of the examination to opposing counsel. Id. at 846-47. This ruling was madeover the objection of the defense expert arguing that she had an ethical obligation not to disclose these materials.Id. at 838. The Court has reviewed the Randy’s Trucking case in detail and finds it to be factually analogous andbinding on this Court. Randy’s Trucking is the controlling authority on this issue. Prohibiting the material frombeing provided to Plaintiff’s counsel would deprive Plaintiff of his fundamental rights to effectively cross-examine the defense expert. Merely giving the material to an expert, who then presumably provides advice anddirection to counsel is not an adequate substitute.Accordingly, the Court will require the defense expert to turn over the raw data and recording to Plaintiff’scounsel. The Court is not unsympathetic to the concerns raised by the defense expert, but they are insufficient tochange the status of the law. The required production will be subject to a protective order which prohibitsPlaintiff’s counsel from disseminating the raw data and recording to anyone other than employees, consultants orstaff. Plaintiff shall also be ordered to destroy the raw data and recording at the conclusion of the case.The motion is partially GRANTED and partially DENIED as outlined above. Defendant shall prepare an orderafter hearing consistent with the Court’s final ruling.
Ruling
IAN LAW, ET AL. VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Aug 08, 2024 |22STCV19719
Case Number: 22STCV19719 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: August 8, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 22STCV19719 MOTIONS: Petition for Minors Compromise MOVING PARTY: Petitioner Henry Utama OPPOSING PARTY: Unopposed The Court has reviewed the petition filed on July 3, 2024 by Petitioner Henry Utama (Petitioner) on behalf of Claimant Ian Law, age 15. The Court denies the petition without prejudice for the following reasons: In a future petition, Petitioner must label the attachments according to the numbers referenced in the petition. Petitioner asserts that Claimant has suffered the following permanent injuries from a laceration from a park bench: nerve damage to his thigh and anxiety. Petitioner provides no medical records regarding anxiety. Petitioner must complete item 10c describing the terms of the settlement. Based on the values in item 12b, Petitioner indicates that $1,470.03 will be reimbursed to private insurance (Rawlings Company) and $710 will be reimbursed to Vimarn Thai Massage. This totals $2,180.03 in medical reimbursem*nts. However, this conflicts with item 12a(4) which only states that $1,470.03 will be reimbursed. Additionally, Petitioner appears to seek reimbursem*nt for $710. Therefore, it is unclear the total amount of medical expenses to be reimbursed, and it is unclear whether the $710 should be reimbursed to Petitioner or Vimarn Thai Massage. Petitioner must amend the values (note: the values in 12b(1-5) should equal the total reimbursem*nt amount sought in 12a(4)). Petitioner requests $36,774.58 in attorney fees which represents 45.96% of the gross settlement. However, this is over the 40% that Petitioners attorney declares he is seeking, and which is stated in the fee agreement. (See Shin Decl. ¶ 14.) The declaration is also insufficient to support the 40% sought. In item 14, Petitioner requests $710 reimbursem*nt for medical expenses. He must include attachment 14 with proof of payment of these expenses. Claimant does not need to sign item 21 since he is not an adult with a disability. Accordingly, the Court denies the petition without prejudice. Petitioner shall give notice and file a proof of service of such.
Ruling
URI PEREZ, AN INDIVIDUAL VS GEORGE ANDERSON, AN INDIVIDUAL
Aug 08, 2024 |19STCV32652
Case Number: 19STCV32652 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: T 19STCV32652 Perez v. AndersonEx parte application for order allowing continuing trial: Continued to 8/15/2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. W. Judge Keeny is out and will be back next week. The court determines that Judge Keeny should hear this application. This continuance is done without hearing.
Ruling
FCS057573 - PEREZ, HEIDI JUDITH VS BOOKER, WESLEY (DMS)
Aug 07, 2024 |FCS057573
FCS057573Motions for ContemptTENTATIVE RULING:Petitioner’s “motions” for contempt are denied.No affidavit of the facts constituting any contempt has been presented to thecourt. The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to acontempt proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211(a); Koehler v. Superior Court(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Oil Workers Int’l Union v. Superior Court(1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 541.) Page 1 of 1
Ruling
LAW OFFICES OF PHOENIX THOTTAM VS JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, ET AL.
Aug 08, 2024 |24STCV09768
Case Number: 24STCV09768 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Law Offices of Phoenix Thottam, Plaintiff, Case No.: 24STCV09768 vs. Tentative Ruling JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Defendant. Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter Demurrer to First Amended Complaint Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint Moving Party: Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. Responding Party: Plaintiff Law Offices of Phoenix Thottam T/R: The demurrer to the second, third, seventh, and eighth causes of action is sustained without leave to amend. The demurrer to the remaining causes of action is sustained with twenty (20) days leave to amend. The motion to strike is denied as moot. Defendant to give notice. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, oppositions and replies. BACKGROUND Plaintiff the Law Offices of Phoenix Thottam sued defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association on April 17, 2024 and filed its operative first amended complaint (FAC) on May 1, 2024. Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action in its FAC: 1. Negligence, 2. Gross Negligence, 3. Mistake, 4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 5. Negligent Misrepresentation, 6. Unfair Business Practices, 7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 8. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 9. Breach of Contract, 10. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and 11. Tortious Interference with Economic Relationships. Plaintiff, a law firm, alleges it maintains its client trust fund account with Defendant, a bank. (FAC, 3:2-11.) Defendant repeatedly misinformed Plaintiff about the status of checks deposited into the account and its consequent available balance. (Id., 4:2-11.) As a result, Plaintiff overdrew its client trust account. (Ibid.) Plaintiff and its clients have suffered harm as a result. (Id., 7:16-10:11.) ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards When considering a demurrer, a court reads the allegations stated in the challenged pleading liberally and in context, and treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The court treats all facts alleged in the complaint as true. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School District (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732.) Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) In granting a motion to strike made under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, [t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Id. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (Id. § 431.10.) The court may also [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id. § 436(b).) B. Evidentiary Rulings Defendant requests judicial notice of a prior ruling in this case and a ruling by the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Both requests are denied. Only the fact that the rulings were made is noticeable, and the fact that the rulings were made is irrelevant. Defendant also submits the declaration of one of its representatives in support of its demurrer. The declaration is stricken. The inquiry upon demurrer is confined to the four corners of the complaint and noticeable materials. (Hahn v. Mirda, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th, at p. 747.) C. Demurrer Defendant demurs to all causes of action in the FAC, arguing each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or is uncertain. Second, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action for Gross Negligence, Mistake, Intentional Infliction, and Negligent Infliction These causes of action in the FAC lack any apparent factual or legal support. As to the second and third causes of action: neither gross negligence nor mistake is a cause of action under California law. (See Erikkson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 856, fn. 18; Code Civ. Proc. § 338(d) [referring to mistake].) As to the seventh and eighth causes of action: an intentional infliction claim requires extreme or outrageous conduct. (Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1242.) A negligent infliction claim requires some sort of special relationship between the tortfeasor and the victim. (Christen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 884.) Both require a plaintiff to plead and prove emotional distress. (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1073; Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921.) This is a dispute between two business entities over alleged banking errors. There are no facts in the FAC that suggest Defendant might be liable on any emotional-distress theory, and Plaintiff has made no showing that it might plead such facts. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to Plaintiffs second, third, seventh, and eighth causes of action. Economic Loss Rule: First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Causes of Action for Negligence, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Negligent Misrepresentation, and Tortious Interference [T]he economic loss rule provides: [W]here a purchaser's expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only economic losses. (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 979, 988 [internal quotations omitted].) The rule is based on the premise that [a] breach of contract remedy assumes that the parties to a contract can negotiate the risk of loss occasioned by a breach, and the law should not impose an additional tort remedy on top of their agreement. (Id., at p. 992.) It is a judicially created doctrine that bars recovery in negligence for pure economic losses when such claims would disrupt the parties private ordering, render contracts less reliable as a means of organizing commercial relationships, and stifle the development of contract law. (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 915.) Plaintiffs claims arise from a mishandling of the funds in a bank account. The handling of those funds is governed by the parties Deposit Account Agreement (DAA), which Plaintiff attached to its complaint and which appears to cover all of Defendants obligations related to the account. Plaintiff has not stated facts that demonstrate it suffered cognizable non-economic injury. As pleaded, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine. The economic loss doctrine is not absolute, and Plaintiff might feasibly reframe his claims in a manner that survives the rule, so the Court sustains as to these causes of action with leave. Sixth Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices Californias Unfair Competition Law (UCL) addresses unfair competition, which . . . include[s] any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . . (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Its purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services. [Citation.] Actions for relief under the UCL may be brought by various government officials and by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition. [Citation.] (McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 954.) Because the UCL is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent. [Citation.] (Adhav v. Midway, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 970.) Plaintiff has not pleaded that Defendant engaged in any practices injurious to consumers or deceitful to the public and has not stated a claim for unfair or fraudulent practices. Because the demurrer has largely been sustained, it is unclear on what violation of the law, if any, he bases an unlawful claim under the UCL. The demurrer to Plaintiffs sixth cause of action is sustained for uncertainty, with leave to amend. Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action for Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Ninth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract The elements of breach of contract are (1) the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse, (3) breach, and (4) injury. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) Defendant contends Plaintiff has not pleaded his claim specifically. Specificity in pleading is not required for a contract claim, and Defendants case law does not suggest otherwise. Richman v. Hartley, supra, was decided on summary judgment and does not control pleading standards; in Bentley v. Mountain (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 95, the plaintiff pleaded that contracts were simply violated, with no supporting facts at all. Plaintiff here identifies the conduct he claims breached the DAA. Levy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-8 is relevant here. In Levy the plaintiff sued his insurer, alleging it failed to pay to repair his car up to industry standards as he contended their contract required. (Levy, supra, at p. 6.) The court found plaintiffs term industry standards was inconsistent with the terms of the contract, which required restoration to pre-loss condition. (Ibid.) The trial court allowed the plaintiff multiple opportunities to demonstrate a link between State Farms alleged violation of industry standards and the insurance contracts State Farm issued. (Ibid.) The plaintiff could not do so, and the court sustained State Farms demurrer without leave. As in Levy, there is a tension between Plaintiffs allegations and the contract he attached to his FAC, which divests Defendant of responsibility for the sorts of overdraft errors Plaintiff has alleged. (See FAC, Ex. G, at pp. 8, 14 [sections III(A)(5), III(E)(1)].) The Court does not agree with Defendant that the tension is fatal to Plaintiffs claims. But the provisions are problematic enough that Plaintiff must clarify. Also, as in Levy, Plaintiffs claims implicate various statutes and regulations the UCC, in particular as well as the parties contract. Levy suggests that where Plaintiff might state claims under many statutory or regulatory theories, but also brings claims based on the parties (complex) contract, he may be required to clarify the basis of his claims more thoroughly at the pleading stage. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to Plaintiffs ninth cause of action for breach of contract. Tenth Cause of Action for Breach of the Covenant The [implied] covenant of good faith and fair dealing [is] implied by law in every contract. (Citation.) The covenant is read into contracts and functions as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the other party's rights to the benefits of the contract. (Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 10311032.) As discussed above, it is unclear which of Plaintiffs allegations it considers a breach of express contract and which it considers a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because of this lack of clarity between the breach of contract and breach of covenant actions, the tenth cause of action fails for uncertainty. The demurrer to Plaintiffs tenth cause of action is sustained for uncertainty, with leave to amend. D. Motion to Strike The demurrer having been sustained, the motion to strike is denied as moot.
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